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'C is for colonies. Rightly we boast, that of all the great nations, Great Britain has most' 
'E is our Empire where the sun never sets. The larger we make it, the bigger it gets' 
 
The above quotations are taken from Mrs. Ernest Ames' popular children's picture book An ABC for Baby 
Patriots, published in 1899.1 While clearly not every child of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain was brought 
up on books like the ABC, they are often seen as exemplars of the public's close cultural relationship with 
Empire and its tangible impact on everyday life, or what Robert MacDonald has called the era's 'Imperialist 
worldview'.2 As the empire seemed to have strongly permeated the national consciousness of this era, it is 
interesting – and crucially important – to investigate how and how far this popular feeling manifested itself in 
the arena of politics, particularly during election campaigns which routinely brought people and politicians 
together in mass public meetings where platform speeches would be delivered.3 This article provides a wide-
ranging analysis of the issue of imperialism in electoral politics during this thirty-year period, particularly 
focussing on its presentation by Liberal and Conservative politicians. In particular, it asks which party used 
imperialism more often, when, and which benefitted most from it politically. It also investigates how 
imperialism intersected with patriotism in the electoral arena in these years, and to what extent the two became 
effectively interchangeable. 
 The recent historiography of imperialism in political history has clearly been influenced by cultural 
historians' focus on Empire's domestic resonance since the 1980s, and the popular 'maximalist' thesis: that 
imperialism was a key paradigm through which contemporaries viewed, understood, and expressed British 
politics, culture, and society in the 1880-1914 period. John Mackenzie is one of its best-known proponents, as 
is Stuart Ward, who has suggested that 'the vast body of work on Empire and metropolitan culture has 
collectively shown [that] an imperial outlook had been an integral feature of British public life'.4 They find 
strong recent support from Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose, and the eleven other contributors to the influential 
edited collection At Home with the Empire. Indeed, Antoinette Burton argues in her chapter on political culture 
that 'for historians of the nineteenth century, the question is, arguably, not whether Empire had an impact on 
domestic life, but how' and that 'imperial questions impinged upon and helped to shape Victorian democracy 
across the nineteenth century'.5 Andrew Thompson, meanwhile, sees imperialism as 'a broadly-based 
participatory movement [which]...drew in people of differing political persuasions... [and] penetrated the 
grassroots of British politics'.6  
 This 'maximalist' thesis chimes with political historian Alex Windscheffel's recent description of 
elections in late-Victorian London as 'imbricated with the cultures of imperialism' and 'suffused with imperial 
and racialised discourses', as it does with Matthew Roberts' highlighting of the 'late-Victorian imperial 
mentality' as a central unifier of 'villa tory' and 'working-class Conservative' appeals in Leeds.7 It is also 
consistent with older histories of political parties which stressed the importance of imperialism to Conservative 
language and ideology in particular from the 1870s on.8 For H.C.G. Matthew, Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech 
of 1872 ‘seized the wand of patriotism from the dead Palmerston's hand, captured the initiative from the Liberal 
Party on the dominant theme of late Victorian Britain- imperialism'.9 Thompson argues that Disraeli's particular 
achievement was to rhetorically refashion the idea of Empire, replacing its traditional mid-Victorian 
connotations of authoritarianism and Napoleonic expansionism with a jingoistic celebration of England's 
providential destiny, superior civilisation, and military might.10 It is thus unsurprising that histories of the 
1880s and 1890s particular emphasis on Empire: it is central to Richard Shannon's Age of Salisbury and Robert 
Rhodes James sees them as the decades where 'the domestic political dividends of an Imperial attitude were at 
their greatest' especially for the Conservatives who were 'emphatically...the Imperial Party, the Patriotic 
Party'.11 John Charmley is equally categorical, asserting that 'the fact that it hardly seems worth mentioning that 
the Conservatives were the party of Empire…is itself proof of the success of Disraeli's work', while E.H.H. 
Green contends that the Home Rule Crisis and the birth of 'Unionism' in 1886 brought into play the Tories' ‘the 
patriotic-imperial card’.12 For the Liberals, the years from Gordon’s death in Khartoum in 1885 (and especially 
from the emergence of the 'Liberal Imperialist' faction under Rosebery from 1895) are seen as marking the start 
of an uncomfortable relationship with Empire, characterised by an intellectual and ideological suspicion of 
reckless territorial expansion, which rendered it a double-edged rhetorical resource at election time.13 
 While the 1880s and 1890s are characterised by consensus on the sustained centrality of imperialism in 
popular politics for Conservatives in particular, the debate becomes more complex when we reach the 
twentieth-century. The so-called 'khaki' election of 1900 – fought five months after the relief of Mafeking and 
when the South African war seemed all but won – has particularly fascinated historians.14  For many scholars – 
including Paul Readman, Iain Sharpe, Jonathan Schneer, and Windscheffel – this wartime election encouraged 
Unionist speakers to push imperialism hard, and forge a new khaki patriotism which emphasised veneration of 
the military, and castigated the Liberals for their 'Pro-Boer' faction.15 This scholarship is a refutation of Richard 
Price's argument that the ‘khaki’ label is a misnomer, and that in most constituencies, the war was subordinate 
to social reform as an election issue.16  Despite recent criticism, numerous general works have offered Price 
explicit support, also arguing that imperialism generated little enthusiasm amongst voters.17 Turning finally to 
the Edwardian period, historians generally agree that the declining position in South Africa from 1902 saw the 
electorate lose their appetite for globe-trotting and bellicosely khaki Salisburyian imperialism, and warm 
towards Campbell-Bannerman's 'true patriotism' which stressed a broader love of country and the amelioration 
of social conditions at home.18 The humanitarian outcry against the 'Randlord' Transvaal mine-owners' use of 
'Chinese slavery' from 1902 also undoubtedly played into Liberal hands. In 1903, however, Joseph 
Chamberlain dramatically counter-attacked with his famous proposition of Tariff Reform (or 'Colonial 
Preference') whose imperial dimensions have – as Thompson rightly points out – been largely overlooked by 
most accounts of the 1906 election.19 For the twin contests of 1910, historians have placed relatively little 
emphasis on Empire as an issue, with it confined mainly to the ongoing argument on tariffs, and (for Unionists) 
a renewed opposition to Irish separatism.20 
 While this discussion on the ebb and flow of Empire as an election issue over these decades is 
important, recent scholarship has been primarily preoccupied with the related linguistic question of the degree 
to which discourses of imperialism and patriotism were contested. For Thompson, Macdonald, Readman, 
Roberts, Miles Taylor and numerous others, the terms ‘patriotic’ and ‘imperial’ were the object of continual 
rhetorical struggles for ownership between parties, pressure groups, and influential individuals.21  Thompson 
likens the terms to ‘an array of empty boxes waiting to be filled, emptied, and refilled by competing 
discourses’.22 This new thinking has heralded a notable retreat from the traditional simple view that the 
Conservatives were unambiguously the party of Empire, and instead stresses that political appeals to 
imperialism and patriotism had to be constructed and shaped according to geography, time, and audience. For 
Windscheffel, 'the language of imperialism remained a contestable terrain in the late-Victorian metropolis' 
while Roberts contends that the Conservatives had no 'monopoly on these assets...they were contestable 
concepts'.23 Green, meanwhile, argues that imperialism's status as a Conservative value was 'neither 'natural' 
nor 'well-established' while Readman counters Hugh Cunningham's assertion that Conservatives enjoyed a 
near-monopoly on patriotism by contending that 'even at the general election of 1900... Liberal Candidates – 
'pro-Boer' as well as 'Liberal Imperialists' – were able to articulate various languages of patriotism'.24 Indeed, 
that historians now view both imperialism and patriotism (in common with many other political ideas and 
concepts) as rhetorically fractured and contested is reflected by the recent fashion of referring not to their 
language, but their 'languages'.25 
 This recent approach, influenced by the poststructuralist 'linguistic turn', has undoubtedly brought 
profound benefits in sensitising scholarship to numerous nuances and counter-trends which were overlooked in 
traditional interpretations of the languages of imperialism and patriotism. However, it has also brought with it 
two major shortcomings. The first is that historians' preoccupation with the contested nature of these discourses 
has made recent accounts extremely reluctant to assess power and political advantage– in other words, whether 
Unionists or Liberals were the dominant users of the languages of imperialism and patriotism, when they used 
them, and which party profited from them electorally. Indeed, when the 'contested' reading is placed alongside 
the other popular view outlined above – that Empire was a dominating societal and political paradigm of the 
period – we are left with the rather unhelpful conclusion that the language of imperialism was used by almost 
everyone, and could mean almost anything. The second shortcoming is that historians have been unhelpfully 
vague on the difference, if any, between the languages of patriotism and imperialism. Thompson for example 
has argued that that 'by the 1890s, it was becoming difficult to separate patriotism and imperialism'.26 This 
tendency to see them as one and the same is epitomized by phrases such as 'patriotic-imperial card' (Green), 
'imperialistic and patriotic appeals' (Price), and 'the "trump" electioneering cards of patriotism and imperialism' 
(Roberts).27 Given the interesting recent finding that patriotic discourses took a notable 'domestic turn' from 
1902, it seems surprising that even recent accounts preoccupied with linguistic nuance have made little effort to 
disentangle the shifting relationship between these two key political concepts.  
 This article attempts to overcome these two shortcomings. Its method is to introduce quantification 
into this debate, which has thus far been conducted exclusively qualitatively. The current inability to measure 
scope and typicality in language is the core problem which renders the argument between the 'maximalists' and 
their 'minimalist' opponents in cultural history virtually insoluble. It is also responsible for the differing 
interpretations on the impact of imperialism as an issue at the various elections in this period. Thompson and 
Simon Potter have rightly highlighted the inherent difficulty of gauging the impact of Empire across political 
discourse, with the latter arguing that 'different historians have adopted very different criteria for deciding what 
evidence is relevant, and for assessing the significance of that evidence'.28 In political history, for example, a 
complete corpus of newspaper reports from a single general election speaking campaign alone easily comprises 
vastly more text than a scholar could hope to manually analyse in several decades. Given that virtually all 
historians face similar textual forests, it seems inevitable that scholars will continually return from their 
respective patches of woodland with conflicting sets of selected qualitative evidence ad infinitum. Rewarding 
as this forensic approach can be, its natural downside is that each reading of the primary source material reveals 
more than it explains. New cultures, discourses, and identities emerge that demand separate study, and push us 
ever further away from even tentative generalisations or explanations. This article thus prioritises a distant 
rather than close reading, and conducts a holistic 'big data' analysis of the issue of imperialism in election 
campaigns in these thirty years. It utilises computer-driven electronic text-analysis methodologies developed in 
Corpus Linguistics (often called 'text mining') and a specially-compiled corpus of five million words of 
digitised national and constituency party platform speeches, taken from newspapers. 
 This article uses corpora – alongside qualitative cases studies – to make three major arguments about 
the prevalence on key themes in electoral language, and their presentation by politicians. Its first (outlined in 
Section II below) develops a suggestion I have made elsewhere: that historians have exaggerated the continued 
centrality of imperialism in election campaigns throughout the 1880-1910 period, and that Empire was actually 
a significant issue only intermittently, most particularly during the 'khaki election'.29 While the article strongly 
supports historians' recent rejection of Price's influential thesis, it contends that this strikingly imperial 
campaign was very much an outlier in these three decades, and that historians have wrongly relied on it to 
sustain a general theory which does not hold throughout the period. While, on face value, the finding that the 
1900 election was the most imperial contest in the period is not surprising, its significance lies the degree of 
difference revealed between it and other contests where we also have reason to expect imperialism was 
important: notably 1880, 1885, and especially 1895. This last election is frequently grouped with 1900 as a 
Unionist landslide carried by imperialism, but the corpora suggest that it was in fact one of the least imperial 
contests in the period. 1900 was thus not simply the highest peak in a range of mountains, but one which 
dwarfed some (but not all) others. This analysis thus poses a challenge for the majority of historians discussed 
above, who must explain why imperialism should be thought of as politically central when politicians relatively 
seldom mentioned the empire from the platform in the six elections outside of 1900, 1906, and 1886. 
 This article's second argument (Section III) concerns the ‘contested’ nature of imperialism and 
patriotism, and the resulting reluctance of historians to offer judgements on which party exploited them more 
often, and more successfully, from the platform in these years. In reference to imperialism specifically, this 
article argues that the traditional reading that Conservatives unambiguously forwarded the more imperial 
appeal is a fair one, notwithstanding the aforementioned vital caveat that neither party emphasised Empire as 
much as historians generally believed. Rather than reinforcing a familiar (but now widely questioned) 
interpretation, this analysis adds a vital dimension by quantifying the size of the Tory rhetorical advantage, 
enabling us to judge whether they led merely by a nose, or by several lengths. As a broad (but strikingly 
consistent) generalisation, Conservatives – across elections, constituencies, and at the top of the party to the 
grassroots – mentioned the empire and related vocabulary close to twice as often as Liberals did, and spent 
close to twice as long talking about it. They also connected it much more relentlessly to politically charged and 
emotional values such as integrity, stability, and glory, whereas Liberals tended to talk about it in more neutral 
and administrative terms. Conservatives did not thus possess a monopoly on imperialism, but they did enjoy a 
strong rhetorical advantage.  
 The third argument (Sections IV and V) is based largely on qualitative case-studies of the campaigns 
of 1900 and 1906 in East Anglia. It is that historians have overemphasised the interchangeability of imperialism 
and patriotism as political values in this period. This article does not argue that these discourses can always be 
reliably separated, but it does contend that the Conservative platform particularly benefitted from an appeal to 
imperialism in the unique circumstances of the 1900 election because they successfully made a bellicose and 
militaristic 'khaki' appeal synonymous with patriotism, while the 'sane imperialism’ of Rosebery, Morley, and 
Campbell-Bannerman – for all its intellectual merits – appeared both convoluted and unpatriotic in comparison. 
However, the speaking campaign in 1900 was not typical, and just over five years later in 1906, the boot was 
placed on the other foot. In this election, the changed political climate saw the languages of imperialism and 
patriotism, which had converged in 1900, once again diverge. While Chamberlain successfully installed 
'Imperial Preference' at the centre of the 1906 campaign, the spectre of rising food prices gave the Liberals the 
rhetorical artillery to question the patriotism of the Unionist vision of imperialism, and thus to disentangle the 
two concepts. By advocating a broader 'love of country' which championed the working classes' material and 
consumer interests through a defence of Free Trade, the Liberal emphasis on domestic above colonial concerns 
successfully appealed, as their opponents had in 1900, to passions just as much as to rationality. It was thus 
patriotism which was the more vigorously contested political value in late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain, 
and one which became synonymous with imperialism only very occasionally: namely in the specific context of 
a khaki election. The historiographical over-reliance on 1900 has thus led scholars to exaggerate the extent to 
which these two values were consistently interchangeable in the political arena in these thirty years. 
 
II 
Imperialism and Electoral Politics, 1880-1910 
 
Perhaps the simplest question we can ask of general elections in this period is also the most challenging: 
namely, what were they actually about? In particular, which issues were emphasised by candidates and parties 
in speeches across the country, and where, when, and how did imperialism fit into this matrix?30 Unfortunately, 
in such huge discourses, the answers are far from obvious. It is deeply problematic – as constituency studies 
such as Jon Lawrence's Wolverhampton and Patricia Lynch's rural England have demonstrated – to assume that 
the orations of national leaders in and outside Parliament necessarily reflected those in six-hundred-odd 
constituencies in a period where local political cultures were often heterogeneous and idiosyncratic.31 This 
makes election campaigns extremely challenging to meaningfully summarise, generalise, and interpret on a 
national scale. 
 While a perfect solution to this problem is unattainable, this article attempts to get as close as feasibly 
possible to a generalised understanding through a systematic investigation of broad linguistic trends using 
multi-million word databanks of party language.32 The two main corpora presented here are composed of 
grassroots speeches, scanned from local newspapers.33 The first is focussed on a specific case-study region – 
East Anglia – and is meticulously designed, containing identical samples of speech for each Norfolk and 
Suffolk constituency at each election.34 The second – the 'Outside East Anglia Corpus' – contains speeches 
from a wide range of constituencies selected to roughly represent (as far as possible given the current 
availability of newspapers in digital form) political language in a diverse cross-section of seats.35 A third 
corpus – of frontbench 'national speakers' – is also used to add context.36 These high-profile speeches are taken 
from The Times, and this corpus includes every extra-parliamentary oration reported from a frontbencher from 
the dissolution of Parliament to the date when the last constituency declared. Together, these three corpora 
contain around five million words, and each is subdivided by party and by election year, with each sub-corpus 
(e.g. East Anglian Liberals in 1892, National Conservatives in 1900 etc.) weighted to be numerically equal. As 
this article covers nine elections, there are thus a total of 27 sub-corpora for each party, and 54 overall. The text 
mining itself (which is kept deliberately straightforward) principally involves electronically counting the 
occurrence of keywords and establishing common patterns between them ('concordancing') with an open-
source software package, Antconc. Clearly, this methodology is not without controversy, and I offer a full 
methodological defence of corpus-driven analysis in political history, and a breakdown of how these particular 
corpora were compiled, elsewhere.37 
 Our first analytical task is to assess the fluctuating significance of imperialism in election speeches 
across the whole 1880-1910 period. To measure the visibility of this complex and multifaceted issue, we must 
first select a group of keywords (a 'taxonomy') which reliably correlate to occasions where party speakers 
talked about the empire. In this case, I have chosen ‘imperial’, ‘empire’, ‘colony’, ‘flag’ and ‘British’.38 The 
purpose of the taxonomy is to give us a reliable (although inevitably imperfect) tracking mechanism, which can 
measure the salience of a given issue in a large corpus without undue complexity. These particular keywords 
were chosen because they correlated most strongly with occasions where speakers were talking about 
imperialism consistently through the whole period, and other keywords omitted because they did not correlate 
strongly.39 These selections are of course matters of historical judgement, but are designed to capture the vast 
majority of relevant language, rather than represent an exhaustive mechanism which misses nothing. So in the 
same way as a modern opinion poll (typically of 1,000 people, with a margin of error of three percentage 
points) is unlikely to perfectly represent national voting intentions, it still delivers data on broad trends and 
fluctuations which, if interpreted carefully, can be invaluable. These keywords (and all others in this article) 
were treated as 'lemmas', so 'Britain' (for example) also includes 'British', 'Britisher', 'Britannia', 'Briton' and all 
other derivatives. Using these five lemmas ensures my concordances miss far less relevant language than if the 
analysis had relied on just one. Crucially, each and every mention of a keyword is manually read and re-
checked in its original context using 'keyword in context' ('KWIC') to make sure no words are included 
incorrectly (e.g. 'flag' referring to flag other than the Union Jack or an opponent 'flagging', and 'colony' 
referring to an ant nest).40 This additional step (which is very seldom taken by other corpus-based analyses) 
renders this quantification extremely careful, and ensures continual cross-referencing back to the original text.41 
 To begin, we will measure the fluctuating visibility of imperial vocabulary throughout the 1880-1910 
period in East Anglia, in constituencies outside East Anglia, and nationally. This is a very substantial analysis, 
and is shown as Figure 1 below. To produce comparable like-for-like readings, each sub-corpus (e.g. East 
Anglian Conservative 1886, National Liberal 1906 etc.) on the graph below, and throughout the article, is 
weighted to 50,000 words. Also, to make Figure 1 more readable,  the individual scores for all five words in the 
imperialism taxonomy are aggregated as a single bar (so for example, the Liberal score for East Anglia in 1892 
is the total for ‘imperial’, ‘empire’, ‘colony’, ‘flag’ and ‘British’ added together): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Language of Imperialism, 1880-1910. Graph includes lemmas ‘imperial’, ‘empire’, ‘colony’, 
‘flag’ and ‘British’ combined in each bar. All readings weighted to 50,000 words. 
 
Figure 1 displays a number of striking trends. Perhaps the most interesting is that Conservatives at the 
constituency (in East Anglia and outside) and national levels are ahead of Liberals in each equivalent 
subsample in all nine elections (27 separate comparisons). Their net score – between all three corpora across all 
elections – is 68% higher.42 In the two grassroots corpora, Conservative scores are particularly strong: roughly 
double that of their opponents in most individual elections, and 91% higher across all nine on aggregate.43 
While these discrepancies certainly could not be interpreted as a Unionist monopoly on imperialism in the 
localities, their leads are nonetheless metronomically consistent, and often very sizeable. On the national stage, 
the Tory advantage is generally more modest (especially in the Edwardian period) although this may simply 
reflect the automatically more national and international ambit of frontbenchers’ speeches, whatever their party. 
However, this more balanced vocabulary distribution on the national stage arguably serves to magnify the 
discrepancy at the grassroots, because it suggests – in local arenas where matters of foreign and imperial policy 
were naturally less compulsory – that Conservative speakers nonetheless chose to prioritise imperialism when 
their Liberal opponents frequently did not. Indeed, it is also singular that the East Anglian readings are 
remarkably similar to those from constituencies outside the region. As well as suggesting that imperialism was 
a genuinely national issue whose importance in campaigns was relatively consistent throughout the country (a 
not insignificant finding given the importance of the 'politics of place' in this period) it also suggests that 
grassroots Unionists – of varying stripes and speaking up and down the country – consistently saw imperialism 
as more important, as a richer rhetorical resource, or both.  
 Figure 1 also reveals fascinating insights on the election-by-election visibility of imperialism during 
these three decades. Perhaps most striking are the readings for 1895, an election frequently seen as an archetype 
of Salisburyian imperial appeal.44 Indeed, R.C.K. Ensor's classic textbook describes the 1895 English electorate 
as 'caught up into the currents of political feeling and doctrine – those of expansive imperialism – with which 
the unionists were ready to comply and most of the Liberals were not'.45 Figure 1, however, suggests that the 
language of 1895 was in fact the least imperial of any election in this period.  Indeed, imperialism's visibility in 
this campaign was lower than Local Veto, an issue often seen as a meagre hobby horse of Harcourt and a group 
of Liberal 'faddists' at the political margins.46 It was also eclipsed by mentions of House of Lords reform, an 
issue which Readman has argued 'aroused no popular passions on a national scale'.47 The relatively low priority 
given to Empire in this election – even by Conservative speakers – is further demonstrated by the fact that only 
11% of Unionist candidates referred to it in their election addresses (behind 18 other issues).48 It was also 
hardly prominent in the NUCCA speaker’s guidebook for 1895: ‘Unity and Integrity of the Empire’ was 
chapter fifteen, appearing behind those on fishermen, miners, and agricultural labourers. It was also just 
fourteen pages in length, one of the shortest in the 636-page manual.49 While it is easy to assume that an 
election (especially a Unionist landslide) held at the high water mark of British imperial supremacy must 
naturally have featured imperialism as a key election issue, the wider linguistic evidence suggests otherwise. In 
this respect, 1895 seems to bear more linguistic similarity to 1892 than it does to 1900.  
More broadly, Figure 1 also suggests that imperialism was not consistently prominent throughout these 
nine elections. Rather, it confirms that while 1886, 1900 and 1906 featured a high concentration of imperial 
vocabulary, the bars for 1880, 1885, and 1892 – like 1895 – sit at a considerably lower level. While some 
existing accounts have already pointed to the exceptionality of 1886 and 1900 (although less so 1906) the 
importance of this quantification lies in the extent of the difference it illustrates. It shows that three elections 
(especially the two twentieth century contests) were not merely slightly, but hugely, more imperial than the 
others. To give further comparative context, in 1880, both the Malt Tax and the Game Laws were cited more 
often than the empire in East Anglian county constituencies.50 In 1885, three proposals from Chamberlain's 
Unauthorised Programme – Free Education, Land Reform, and Church of England Disestablishment – each 
dwarfed imperialism in both grassroots corpora.51 And in 1892, the proposed reform of parish and district 
councils (an issue that has received negligible scholarly attention) similarly also came out ahead, except 
amongst national speakers.52 In the Edwardian period, readings for imperialism are generally higher, but in 
January 1910, 'pensions' (as just a single keyword) were referred to more often by grassroots Liberals, and in 
December 1910, direct mentions of Balfour's dubious promise to hold a post-election referendum on Tariff 
Reform emerged ahead of references to 'empire' and 'imperial' combined in four of the six sub-corpora for this 
contest.53  
These comparisons – taken alongside Figure 1 – strongly suggest that the discourse of late-Victorian 
and Edwardian electoral politics was not consistently saturated with imperial vocabulary as has been widely 
assumed. Rather, Empire's visibility in political language – despite its obvious centrality to British culture, 
society, and thought – was unstable, and dependent on the electoral weather. Indeed, it seems fair to argue that 
imperialism was not unlike other political issues in this period which historians have been rather less interested 
in. Like the Newcastle Programme, Old Age Pensions, or Church Disestablishment, imperialism's importance 
could wax and wane from election to election, and it seems fairer to describe it as an issue of occasional rather 
than permanent importance. In this respect, this finding supports the comparatively small number studies of 
popular politics of this period where Empire is not singled out for special attention, such as those of Lawrence 
and Lynch.54 More broadly, this conclusion serves as a reminder that the language of electoral politics did not 
necessarily simply passively reflect the times – or developments in high politics or political thought – but was 
its own independent and distinct discourse. 
 
III 
 
While Figure 1's word-counts are extremely enlightening, this aggregate analysis is naturally unable to shed 
light on how language was actually used by parties, and how key terms was connected to political arguments, 
values, and traditions. The corpus can once again provide invaluable assistance by illuminating key linguistic 
trends and broad vocabulary patterns. Taking single keywords, Antconc can list common collocates (words 
which appear in the same sentence or within a given word-span).55 It can then rate them by 'lexical attraction', 
using a popular metric, the 'Mutual Information' (MI) score.56 We can thus dig deeper into the underlying 
lexicography of party language in this thirty-year period. To begin, collocates of the keyword 'empire' will be 
tracked in both grassroots corpora (East Anglia plus other constituencies) combined, for all nine elections, to 
include the widest possible sample of constituency language, some 3 million words. The top twenty strongest 
collocates of 'empire' (for Conservatives and Liberals respectively) are shown as Figure 2 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Top 20 collocates of 'empire' in grassroots electoral language, 1880-1910. Conservatives are 
displayed left, the Liberals right.57 
 
Figure 2 suggests strongly that when the empire was mentioned by either party, it was usually in the context of 
upholding its 'unity', 'stability', and 'integrity'. However, there are also important differences between the 
parties. The most telling is that the words Conservatives used are in most cases self-evidently expressive of 
emotive political arguments, for example 'dismemberment', 'disintegration', 'disruption', 'glorious' etc. Only four 
Conservative words might be judged as 'neutral' at face-value ('within', 'parts', 'vast' and 'world'). For the 
Liberals, however, there are thirteen ('parts', 'part', 'whole', 'up', 'our', 'the', 'is', 'are', 'than', 'about', 'this', 'of' and 
'one') which fit this description. Their seemingly more diluted focus is also reflected by the fact that their MI 
score for their twentieth collocate ('Ireland') is 5.11, whereas the Conservatives' twentieth ('world') stands at a 
considerably stronger 8.14. Indeed, we need to read down the Tory list to number 91 before they drop below an 
MI of 5.11. This all suggests that Conservative speakers did not just refer to the empire more often, but more 
persistently connected it to a smaller number of politically and emotionally charged values and arguments, 
whereas Liberal mentions were more multifarious and likelier to be neutral. This finding is also confirmed by 
an identical analysis tracking collocates of 'imperial', which finds six synsemantic words in the Liberal top 
twenty ('an', 'what', 'is', 'are', 'must', 'from' ) and just one ('we'- in twentieth position) for the Conservatives.58 
 Figures 1 and 2 thus suggest that imperialism was a more consistently important part of the 
Conservative rhetorical armoury than the Liberal, both quantitatively and qualitatively. That there was a 
rhetorical contest for Empire is beyond doubt, but that should not stop us from concluding that it was rather 
one-sided. While this finding seems at face-value to reinforce the traditional reading of historians such as 
Shannon, Charmley and Rhodes-James that the Conservatives were the party of Empire, it also for the first time 
quantifies what this might actually have meant in practice. From this quantification, an important caveat 
emerges. Namely, that the finding that Conservative speakers talked about imperialism almost twice as often 
must be contextualised by the parallel observation that Empire was almost certainly a less consistently central 
election issue in these three decades than these historians in particular have implied. The Conservatives led 
fairly unambiguously, but on an electoral race-track smaller than that hitherto imagined. 
 
IV 
Case Studies of the Elections of 1900 and 1906 
 
This article's third and final objective is to disentangle the often-conflated languages of imperialism and 
patriotism. This is an inherently more qualitative question, demanding a close reading of the texts to 
accompany the quantitative analysis. This section therefore presents two case studies of the elections of 1900 
and 1906 in East Anglia– contests which Figure 1 suggests were the most imperial in the period. There is not 
space to also discuss 1886 in detail, but it is worth mentioning in passing that Figures 1 and 2 provide some 
prima facie corroboration both of Savage, whose largely overlooked study of this election argues that 'Home 
Rule was far more potent in rousing the imperial spirit of Britain than were speeches and postures of Disraeli in 
the previous decade', and of Lord Salisbury, who concluded that the election had 'awakened the slumbering 
genius of imperialism'.59  
 Turning first to 1900, the natural initial question is whether the high visibility of imperialism in this 
election can be explained by the South African war. Its centrality as an issue seems hard to dispute on face 
value: the lemmas ‘Boer’, ‘Kruger’, ‘Transvaal’ and ‘Africa’ are all sizeable new entries into the electoral 
vocabulary for both parties at the grassroots, and nationally.60 In the same vein, the scores for military words 
(‘troop’, ‘army’, ‘soldier’, ‘military’, and ‘navy’) all increased hugely.61 Perhaps most strikingly, the lemma 
‘war’ advanced over fortyfold from the previous election, from a combined East Anglian party score of 11 in 
1895 to 449 in 1900, with almost identical jumps outside the region and nationally.62 'War' alone in fact 
comprised almost 0.5% of all words uttered in and outside East Anglia (on par with synsemantic staples such 
as 'this', 'have', and 'from'). Interestingly, these linguistic developments were foreshadowed in Parliament. 
Using a special corpus consisting of all parliamentary debates recorded in Hansard from the year preceding the 
dissolutions for the 1895 and 1900 elections – and a taxonomy designed to track the war issue as holistically as 
possible – we find that the aggregate scores increased from 50 (year preceding 1895) to 577 (year preceding 
1900).63 This suggests that candidates transferred the agenda from Parliament to campaign platform. On this 
statistical evidence alone, the war was almost as dominant an issue as Ireland had been in 1886, and it would 
hardly seem unfair to similarly label 1900 as a ‘single issue’ election.64 Perhaps most critically for this study, a 
KWIC analysis of mentions of 'empire' and 'imperial' across all corpora finds that nearly 85% were directly 
attributable to the war, conclusively confirming the intuitive hypothesis that it was this issue that caused the 
spike in the language of imperialism in this election. These findings – both the prominence of the war, and its 
connection with imperialist rhetoric – are obviously deeply problematic for Price's influential thesis. 
 Having established the centrality of the war to the language of imperialism in 1900, we can now 
investigate how the Conservatives managed to cast themselves as the 'patriotic party'. The bald fact that they 
spoke about imperialism so much more often than Liberals in and outside East Anglia is clearly important, but 
the subtleties of their appeal can be better understood through a closer reading. To start with, Conservative 
celebrations of Empire were grandiose, and left no doubt that to be an imperialist was to be a patriot. W.L. 
Priorleau (East-Norfolk) 'pleaded' with his audience 'to vote straight for the Unionist party, for in-so-doing they 
would be doing their share in upholding the glory of the greatest empire that ever existed in the world' while 
H.S. Foster (Lowestoft) described the purpose of the election as to 'decide whether the great British Empire was 
to be maintained or not...it was a battle between the Little Englander and the Big Englander'.65 In King's Lynn, 
Thomas Gibson-Bowles pointed to a Union Jack pinned above his platform and asked his audience to: 
 
‘Look at that flag … it has a great and glorious history. There are no standards of Europe … that have not gone 
down before that flag…do not forget its past. That flag floated at the mainmast of the Victory when Nelson 
sailed into action at Trafalgar; that flag waved over the British squares at Waterloo…God grant that this flag, 
which so many times has shaken out its folds and brought freedom to the slave, comfort to the oppressed, may 
once more honour the name of Victoria’.66 
 
Praising the empire was not simply confined to abstract jingoism. Conservatives were also not averse to 
celebrating the expansion of imperial territory. Harry Bullard (Norwich) boasted that ‘Lord Salisbury had 
demonstrated the might of the empire by sending 200,000 men 7,000 miles’, a military manoeuvre which, 
according to Captain Pretyman (Woodbridge) ‘no other nation could hope to accomplish’.67 Meanwhile, Foster 
proudly declared that more territory had been added to the empire than in any other five-year period.68 This 
swagger was arguably something new; in the 1880s, the scale of military operations and territory acquired by 
Disraeli and Gladstone often represented albatrosses for their parties.69 But in 1900, the zeitgeist had 
transformed to the extent that W.H.B. Ffolkes (Norfolk North-West) rebutted Liberal accusations that for the 
cost of a single gun, 500 labourers’ families could be kept in comfort, by asking: ‘Where would the families be 
without that gun?...England would become a province of France…where would the Union Jack be if not for our 
guns?’.70 It seems doubtful that such defence would have been inkeeping with the political weather in (for 
example) 1885, when rural poverty was high on the agenda in East Anglia.71 But in the charged climate of 
1900, it became much easier to simply articulate love of country as being synonymous with a pride in Britain's 
military capacity and ability to project force internationally.  
 The militaristic chord in the Unionist appeal was also helped by the fact that, in East Anglia, eight of 
the twenty candidates had links to the forces.72 These men certainly exploited their advantage; Priorleau and 
Edward Mann (South-Norfolk) explained their absences from their constituencies by their involvement with the 
Fourth Norfolk Militia.73 Meanwhile, Thomas Hare (South-West Norfolk) spoke of his honour in leading his 
regiment in a parade through the county, Gibson-Bowles recalled his involvement in the Franco-German war 
during the siege of Paris, and the Lynn Advertiser insisted that Mid-Norfolk candidate William Boyle – who 
had never been in the forces – was still a military man by dint of his distant (and until now forgotten) descent 
from a Knight-Commander of the Hanoverian Guelphite order.74 Clearly, Unionists were at pains to seem as 
close as possible to the forces in 1900 because it represented a nigh-unrebuttable trump card that the Liberals – 
with far fewer military men – struggled to counter. 
 More broadly, the popular militarism of 1900 seems to have encouraged Unionist speakers to employ 
the language of battle more generally. Combined readings for the lemmas 'fight’, ‘victory’, ‘duty’, ‘honour’, 
‘loyal’, ‘opponent’, 'enemy' and ‘strength’ registered 322 for grassroots Conservatives in and outside East 
Anglia: 49% higher than the equivalent score of 216 for the Liberals.75 Electioneering efforts were presented as 
both soldierly and manly endeavours. The motto introduced by Mann to his South-Norfolk volunteers was to 
‘fight like Bobs and win!’ and Priorleau told his followers to ‘all work like blacks, and not enter the fight with 
any idea they were going to lose’.76 Ffolkes and his supporters – challenging the Liberal stronghold of North-
West Norfolk – were said to have ‘fought like Baden-Powell had done in the defence of Mafeking’ and Boyle 
was accompanied by a brass band which played ‘See the Conquering Hero Come’.77 Occasionally, candidates 
claimed that voting Unionist was an extension of national duty: Gibson-Bowles told his audience ‘I tell you it is 
your duty to vote for me! For the sake of your country, do your duty on the day of the election’.78 Hare, 
meanwhile, reassured his South-West Norfolk audience that although ‘all of them would have liked to have 
been out at the front’ the young men who came forward to ‘help in his battle’ would also be helping to smite 
Kruger and the Boers.79 As John Tosh has argued, this ‘militarisation of hegemonic masculinity served to 
bolster the indispensability of manly attributes’, and it is notable that any similar emphasis on militarism and 
duty was almost wholly absent from East Anglian Liberal platforms.80 Interestingly, Kit Good's analysis of 
masculinity and the platform finds that manliness was also often presented in military terms in both Edwardian 
and interwar elections.81 Given that all of Good's examples are on the Tory side, it seems possible that the 
khaki election prompted an enduring 'military turn' in the political presentation of masculinity amongst 
Conservatives, placing what seemed to be represent a powerful rhetorical weapon in their hands, which their 
opponents lacked. 
 The final part of the Unionists’ imperial appeal in 1900 was a full-blooded assault on their Liberal 
opponents as weak, divided, and of questionable loyalty. Their general inclination to pacifism would make 
them ‘shrink from the dread responsibility of war’ (J.F. Rawlinson, Ipswich), give ‘opposition to everything 
connected the defence of the nation’ (Samuel Hoare, Norwich), and make them ‘turn tail and ran away’ from 
the Boers (Priorleau).82 Even if a Liberal candidate was not a pro-Boer himself, he was still from the same 
party as sympathisers such as Ellis, Labouchere, and Clark. This idea of ‘guilt by association’ was also 
extended more widely: to connect Liberals with the pro-Boer Irish Parliamentary Party, with Gladstone, who 
had abandoned Gordon in Khartoum and presided over the debacle at Majuba Hill, and with the anti-British 
continental press, who apparently wanted a Liberal victory.83 The Unionist dichotomy – between militaristic 
loyalist and anti-imperial traitor – was stark, and connection with a 'disloyal' agency of any kind could 
contaminate a Liberal candidate. 
For their part, many Liberals in 1900 were instinctively unhappy with describing themselves as 
‘imperialists’. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1898, the term held numerous pejorative connotations: of reckless 
territorial expansion, unjustified violations of sovereignty, military adventurism, political demagoguery, and 
authoritarianism of foreign powers such as Napoleon III’s France.84 Because few Liberals openly opposed the 
war itself – confining themselves mainly to criticising the government’s handling of military preparations – it 
has often been argued that they failed to articulate a coherent counter-vision to the Unionists’ avowedly 
imperialistic patriotism.85 However, this view has been challenged by Hamer and Thompson, who have argued 
that the emerging ‘Liberal-Imperialism’ of Lord Rosebery – which focussed on social reform at home as well 
as military affairs abroad – was gaining widespread traction within the party, and by T.J. Otte’s study of by-
elections from 1898, which demonstrates the increased prominence of these ideas on Liberal platforms.86 
Readman has perhaps gone furthest, arguing that Liberals in the 1900s attempted to articulate an alternative 
domestic-centred patriotism which did not have to be tied to imperialism.87 
 Interestingly, while Liberals were comfortably outscored by their opponents on mentions of both the 
war and imperialism in 1900, they were by no means silent on patriotism.  In and outside East Anglia, Liberals 
mentioned this lemma virtually the same number of times as Conservatives in this election, and outscored them 
by nearly three to one on the national stage.88 Some of these were simple celebrations: a King’s Lynn Liberal 
declared ‘true liberalism in politics’ as being ‘purely patriotic in national service and national life’ and 
Alderman Adams (Lowestoft) claimed ‘I am neither Liberal nor Conservative, I am patriotic’.89 Indeed, both 
East Anglian parties, not just the Conservatives, widely used Union Jacks as party icons in 1900.90 However, 
the vast majority (79%) of the 71 Liberal mentions of ‘patriotism’ across all 1900 corpora were challenges to 
the notion that the Unionists were the more patriotic party, and attempts to reclaim the idea on behalf of 
Liberalism. George White (North-West Norfolk) questioned the notion that ‘every officer is a Tory’ or that 
‘Tommy Atkins is a Unionist’, and Richard Winfrey (South-West Norfolk) remarked that ‘the Tory party might 
attempt to allocate themselves a monopoly on patriotism, but the Liberal Party were equally as patriotic as the 
Tories and equally proud of the British Empire’.91 Outside East Anglia the tone was similar. The Hartlepool 
candidate Christopher Furness rubbished 'the claim which the Unionists are making that theirs is the only 
patriotic party' and claimed that 'he, as a Liberal, was as ready to make sacrifices for the flag as any Tory' while 
in Barnsley, a local Liberal complained that 'the Conservative candidate...sought to hide himself under khaki, 
and claimed a monopoly of patriotism, which was an insult to the intelligence of the Liberals'.92 These 
grassroots appeals closely echoed Edward Grey’s attack on the ‘gigantic imposture...on the Government side to 
claim for themselves and their supporters a monopoly of patriotism’.93 
 As well as defending their own patriotic credentials, the Liberals also articulated their own version of 
‘love of country’ which Readman has described as a ‘high-minded patriotic constitutionalism’.94 This 'sane 
imperialism’ (as it was originally christened by Rosebery in 1899) was characterised by a distaste for imperial 
aggression, a reservation of the right to criticise military decisions and conduct, a suspicion of blind adherence 
to flag, and paying due attention to social conditions at home.95 It was opposed to excessive force not simply 
for pacifistic reasons, but because diplomacy was often wiser. Winfrey was not alone in arguing that ‘the war 
might have been avoided with wiser and more tactful diplomacy’, something that Chamberlain (who had called 
Kruger a ‘squeezed sponge’ and likened negotiating with Russia to ‘supping with the devil with a long spoon’) 
understood poorly.96 It was patriotic also to question the tactical decisions of generals or the state of armaments 
in order to learn from mistakes and maximise military efficiency, just as it was patriotic to consider the whole 
war machine (most of whose apparatus lay at home with the working classes in the factories) rather than 
fixating only on troops at the front.97 Tory appeals to ‘khaki’ were thus largely condemned as attempts to 
bypass the rationality of voters and present the patriotic exercise of the franchise as an act of duty above a 
considered decision. 
While this ‘sane imperialism’ represented a determined attempt to challenge the resolutely imperial 
and militaristic Unionist narrative of patriotism, its proponents were gloomily aware that they were fighting an 
uphill battle. Liberal appeals to 'sane-imperial' patriotism were as complex and counter-intuitive as their 
opponents’ 'khaki' patriotism was simple and intuitive. Unionists could simply point at the Union Jack to make 
their argument, while the Liberal rebuttal – what Herbert Samuel called their 'policy of rational patriotism' – 
required lengthy exposition.98 Indeed, the intense Liberal defensiveness over their patriotic credentials perhaps 
revealed an underlying pessimism in the electorate’s political intelligence and a growing fear of the psychology 
of the herd.99 White (North-West Norfolk) bemoaned that ‘the salvation of the Tories is the short memory of 
voters...the curse of the military spirit which has been roused...means the neglect of all social questions’ and a 
depressed Harcourt reflected that the electorate had conceived of the war like ‘a savage tribe’.100 Much the 
same sentiment was echoed in the progressive journal Justice which complained that the electorate had treated 
the war issue with the civic consciousness of 'a howling, brutalised savage'.101 Speaking in 1906, a Yarmouth 
Liberal solemnly recalled 'how five years ago the Tories waved the patriotic flag, beat the imperialist drum, and 
sounded their trumpets...the electors were hypnotised into sending the late government into power'.102 Indeed, 
the radical organ of London working men’s clubs, Club Life, reacted to the defeat by complaining that ‘we are 
glad that manhood suffrage is not an acknowledged fact...many of the people...are too naturally ignorant to 
understand what an election really means... they have no time to read and think – they know nothing of the 
great problems of our time’.103 The Conservatives – popularly characterised as 'the stupid party' by their 
opponents – were in Liberal eyes well-placed to exploit this. T.R. Terrell (Norwich) complained in 1895 that 'if 
it were not for ignorance workingmen would not be persuaded to join the Tory party...ignorance is the force we 
have to fight against and defeat'.104 For a Stowmarket Liberal councillor, this ignorance was sustained by the 
Conservative mission to 'always obstruct the wheels of progress…to train up scores of… men and women who 
would be saturated with Toryism'.105 
The idea that the Liberals traditionally saw their appeal as anchored first and foremost in rationality is 
consistent with general picture delineated by Jonathan Parry, Eugenio Biagini, and D.A. Hamer.106 Indeed, 
Matthew suggests that their speakers saw public meetings as mature forums for debate and the ventilation of 
ideas, rather than as partisan platforms from which to enflame political passions.107 However, Liberal attacks 
on Tory irrationality perhaps betrayed an underlying fear that the politics of jingoistic stupidity would be 
electorally effective. Graham Wallas described the political power of 'acts…which aim at producing an exalted 
emotional effect among ordinary slow-witted people'.108 For Michael Freeden, 'successful ideologies require 
powerful emotional symbols, or...a language which evokes strong sentiments, even passion' and – as John 
Hobson came to famously argue in his Psychology of Jingoism – imperialism was a prime example.109 For 
contemporary commentator T.E. Kebbel, the Conservatives seemed more in tune with 'the power of…the 
romantic, picturesque, and venerable…which speaks to the heart rather than to the head' and R.B. Haldane 
grudgingly admitted even in 1888 that, while the Liberals had cooler heads, the Conservatives better 
understood human instinct.110 While the Liberals may have bemoaned the electorate's defective intelligence, 
their analysis of the 1900 defeat also constituted a unstated admission that – while both parties advanced 
competing definitions of patriotism – the Unionist version was better adapted to the modern platform precisely 
because it was so simple and intuitive. The new democracy was an unforgiving environment for a self-
consciously intellectual party, and the particular circumstances of a khaki election arguably made it politically 
untenable to force a dichotomy between 'sane' and 'insane' imperialism, or to decouple imperialism from 
patriotism. 
     V 
 
While imperialism and patriotism had been made synonymous in 1900, this was to change markedly in 1906. 
The Unionist policy of Tariff Reform (or 'Colonial Preference' as Chamberlain initially christened it) was 
primarily designed to bind the mother country closer to her colonies with commercial ties.111 The effect seems 
to have been to render 1906 the second-most imperial election in the period, as demonstrated by Figure 1. This 
picture seems inconsistent with A.K. Russell's account of this election, which contains little on imperialism, 
and finds that 'preservation of the Empire' was only the tenth most-cited issue in Unionist candidates' election 
addresses (mentioned in just 25%) and did not feature in the Liberals' top twenty.112 More recent major studies, 
such as those of Frank Trentmann and David Thackeray, also say relatively little on Empire for this contest.113 
This suggests that 1906 may be the one election in this period whose imperial dimensions have been 
underestimated.114 Significantly, Tariff Reform seems to be largely responsible for imperialism's prominence in 
this contest; a lexical attraction analysis for both grassroots corpora centred around the keywords 'imperial' and 
'colony' shows that the top ten collocates (for both parties) includes 'food', 'Chamberlain', 'preference', 'closer' 
'relationship', 'relations', and 'mother'.115 This compares with just three (in positions eight, nine, and ten) which 
might be explained by the Chinese labour controversy ('Cape', Transvaal', and 'coolies'). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, all ten East Anglian Unionist candidates who endorsed Chamberlain's proposals as 'whole 
hoggers' explicitly praised the policy's imperial credentials. Francis Hervey (Bury St. Edmunds) described 
himself as ‘a follower of that great colonial statesman, Mr. Chamberlain’ and Raymond Boileau (East-Norfolk) 
claimed simply that ‘he was an imperialist and a big Englander, and wanted to see the colonies bound more 
closely to their mother country’.116 Even amongst the remaining six East Anglian Balfourites, none openly 
questioned the imperialist credentials of the policy, with even the sceptical Edward Wild (Norwich) declaring 
that a general measure of Tariff Reform was ‘a policy which would...consolidate the British Empire’.117 Again, 
this paints a somewhat different picture to Russell, who argues that divisions between Balfourites and 
Chamberlainites led to imperialism being used only intermittently to justify the policy.118  
Chamberlain’s renewed appeal to imperialism seemed to stem in large part from his faith in it as a 
populist electoral weapon, as had been evidenced by 1900.119 But his attempt to once again use Empire to claim 
the patriotic mantle misread the public’s exhaustion with the war, which had dragged on until 1902, and had 
seemingly already contributed to a string of by-election losses.120 This dampening of public enthusiasm did 
much to deflate the Unionists' khaki patriotism, and reciprocally, to inflate the Liberals' domestic-centred 
counter-narrative which had struggled to fly in 1900.121 In 1904, Campbell-Bannerman – echoing the platform 
of 1900 – declared that ‘true patriotism...seeks not aggrandisement of any particular class or interest ... but the 
comfort, the improvement, and the best welfare of the people at large’.122 His lead was followed at the 
grassroots in the election eighteen months later, and Liberals began to articulate a patriotism without its 
previous imperial touchstone, with constituency speakers in and outside East Anglia mentioning the lemma 
‘patriot’ more than four times as often as Unionists.123 Edward Beauchamp (Lowestoft) believed that ‘they 
heard a lot, probably too much, of the word “imperial”. He thought all in that room were in one sense 
imperialists, [but] he did not agree with Mr Chamberlain in his interpretation and application of the word...if 
our Empire was to be maintained, young people must be trained to temperance, thrift, manliness, and 
honesty’.124 The Yarmouth clergyman, Reverend Guttery, also took aim at ‘the man in Birmingham' who 'was 
once more attempting to hold aloft the tattered flag of prostituted patriotism, and was a mere echo of the 
madness which had once deluded the nation, madness that they would be very glad to forget’. He went on to 
describe: 
 
‘Two types of patriotism.  There was the patriotism such as their fathers knew...the patriotism that was willing 
to tell England if need be, unpopular truths, the patriotism that was ready to work, suffer ...to widen the bounds 
of liberty and to win the people a good life [Cheers]. And there was the patriotism of swagger, the boasting and 
blatancy, the patriotism of the stock exchange, the patriotism of Park Lane, the patriotism that...could not shout 
"rule Britannia" except with a beery hick-up.’125 
 
Outside East Anglia, similar criticisms of the Unionists' misplaced imperialism were made. George Lambert 
(Devon, South Molton) poured scorn over the 'new imperial gospel of Mr. Chamberlain' and mocked his 
proposal to exclude imported maize from tariffs, arguing that 'maize is the food of pigs... what imperial 
aspiration! Free food for an imperial race of pigs! [laughter]'.126 In Derby, a local Liberal – J.P.G. Shires – 
explained the changing zeitgeist, stating that 'the Tory party seemed to imagine that they enjoyed a monopoly 
on patriotism, and they delighted to dub their opponents Pro-Boers or Little Englanders; but the moral 
sentiments of the people were rising above such insults, and they were recognising that Jingoism and so-called 
Imperialism was not true patriotism'.127  
  Perhaps the Unionists’ – and Chamberlain’s – mistake after 1900 was to assume that a robust imperial 
appeal would automatically allow them to retain their pre-eminence as the patriotic party. If so, they were 
mistaken. Tariff Reform did succeed in once again placing Empire prominently on the 1906 election agenda, 
but this time it clearly failed to trump the Liberals' counter-appeal to 'domestic' patriotism, suggesting that 
imperialism's utility as a vote-winner was conditional, rather than universal. War weariness clearly helped tip 
the scales, but perhaps the decisive factor was simply that however popular the imperial credentials of Tariff 
Reform might have been in isolation, they were poisoned by the spectre of rising food prices. In East Anglia, 
vivid Liberal anecdotes of a return to ‘the hungry forties’ under the Corn Laws were combined with famous 
posters such as ‘save the children from Tariff Reform’ and ‘the big and the little loaf' to create a simple and 
pithy electoral appeal powerful enough to smite Chamberlain's offering, whether wrapped in the Union Jack or 
not. These appeals were allied with popular exhibitionism (traditionally a Tory forte) featuring horseflesh 
sausage displays, didactic circus acts in seaside towns such as Yarmouth and Lowestoft, and Free Trade song 
parties.128 Chamberlain – the man Lloyd George described as ‘the raging bull from Birmingham ... smash[ing] 
up the great shop of the world’ – was cast as the pantomime villain.129 Balfour was his comically pathetic 
subordinate, whom Daniel Goddard (Ipswich) dismissed as ‘the alleged leader who was really a lady help to 
Mr. Joseph Chamberlain’.130 As Michael Bentley has put it, the full-bodied attack on protectionism ‘removed 
the need to think’.131 Such Liberal humour was widespread, and critically, one-sided; the corpus shows that the 
traditionally more sober Liberals now evoked more laughter from grassroots audiences in and outside East 
Anglia in 1906 by the remarkable margin of 325 hits to 162.132 The Liberals had managed to discover a simple 
populism which enabled them to exploit, rather than hide from, the mass electorate's appetite for the politics of 
passion. By contrast, the Unionists were now the party lumbered with the more counter-intuitive appeal which 
ran against the zeitgeist. With the addition of Free Trade (with its important implications of material wellbeing) 
the argument that had begun as 'sane imperialism' in 1900 was transformed, and the Liberals found it much 
easier to confidently cast themselves as the patriotic defenders of British workmen. Although they developed a 
more punchy and dynamic popular appeal, the real Liberal success in 1906 arguably lay not in matching the 
Unionists as imperialists, but in successfully differentiating love of country from love of Empire (one major 
regional Liberal newspaper went so far as to describe Imperial Preference as 'gross treachery' because it 
betrayed the 'great principle' of Free Trade).133 By doing so, the Liberals were able to cast the Unionists as a 
destabilising and dangerous political force precisely because they were so ideologically obsessed with 
imperialism through their crusade of Colonial Preference. 
 In conclusion, it seems surprising that historians have so often conflated imperialism and patriotism in 
this period. In 1900 and 1906 the two were clearly interrelated, and frequently spoken of together by both 
parties. However, it could be said that patriotism was by far the more explicitly contested political value. It is 
far harder (as demonstrated by the quantitative analyses above) to say the same of imperialism, and Liberal 
attempts in 1900 to fight their opponents on this territory were clearly unconvincing, and inspired ironic 
derision. Goddard and Noel Buxton (Ipswich) were accused of ‘masquerading in the garb of imperialists’; 
White (North-West Norfolk) as turning 'increasingly red, white and blue’; Frederick Handel-Booth (King's 
Lynn) as ‘a little off colour’ in his new khaki suit’, and Winfrey (South-West Norfolk) as having transformed 
from the ‘peaceful man’ of 1895 to the ‘warlike man who went in for the Union Jack’.134 The Liberals were 
arguably successful in 1906 precisely because they no longer needed to pose as imperialists to convincingly 
claim to be patriotic. This is not to say the Liberals entirely abandoned imperialism to their opponents (indeed, 
they attempted to re-establish it on less a less sordid footing in the years that followed).135 But in 1906, Empire 
remained predominantly a Unionist rhetorical resource even at the party's lowest electoral ebb; it was patriotism 
which was contested and successfully reclaimed by the Liberals in 1906, using many of the same domestically-
focussed arguments that had failed in 1900. Indeed, this finding further suggests that while 'sane imperialism' 
was a disastrous platform to fight the 'khaki election', that its silver lining was indirectly to lay the intellectual 
foundations for a Liberal recovery five years later when the political weather changed. This implies an 
important qualification to Trentmann's Free Trade Nation, which sees the gestation of the winning Liberal 
platform in 1906 as beginning from 1903 with Tariff Reform, rather than one which, at least partially, evolved 
from the wreckage of 1900.136 
 
VI 
 
This article has argued for three major revisions to the debate on imperialism and patriotism in politics in this 
period. The first, as argued in section II, is that imperialism was a key election issue in this period only 
intermittently– most notably in 1886, 1900, and 1906. In other contests – especially 1885, 1892, and 1895 – it 
was relatively seldom mentioned. This should be taken as a major challenge to historians who have assumed 
that the high age of imperialism must necessarily have featured imperialism as a consistently central electoral 
issue. This article's second argument is that it is wholly inadequate to conclude that imperialism was a 
contested discourse simply because both parties talked about it, and that neither enjoyed a monopoly. 
Throughout the 1880-1910 period, the Conservatives mentioned the empire around twice as often, and when 
they did, connected it more consistently with politically and emotively charged values, concepts, and traditions. 
The languages of imperialism might well have resembled Thompson's 'array of empty boxes waiting to be 
filled, emptied, and refilled by competing discourses' but this stock check has found – in the world of party 
politics at least – that a hefty majority of them held Conservative contents. The final argument is that historians' 
reluctance to differentiate between the languages of imperialism and patriotism has led to them being 
unhelpfully lumped together. Love of country and imperialist credentials could become interchangeable in 
certain specific political circumstances (namely in 1900) but there is little evidence that the khaki election 
formed an enduring link between Empire and patriotism in the political arena. Indeed, in the very next election 
in 1906 the Unionists once again fought a heavily imperial campaign, but were nonetheless outmanoeuvred by 
the Liberals on patriotism. The patriotic, not the imperial, was thus the more keenly contested political 
discourse throughout the period, and was thus almost certainly the more electorally significant.  
 It could be argued that these three shortcomings that have hampered the debate on imperialism in this 
period have in each case stemmed from a historiographical overreliance on the election of 1900. This big-data 
analysis allows us to set this famous contest in context– as an outlier. Future qualitative scholarship on 
imperialism and patriotism in late-Victorian and Edwardian British politics could fruitfully move away from 
this important but unique election, and concentrate instead on others which have received considerably less 
attention. Such an approach will allow us to set imperialism in its proper place as one election issue amongst 
others, and also to better understand how it was presented in overlooked campaigns which were nonetheless far 
more typical of popular political life in these three decades.  
 In closing, it should be stressed that the above conclusions are not an attempt to downplay the 
importance of 1900 as a landmark contest. On the contrary, this article has argued that imperialism was 
important in this election not so much because it represented the high water mark of Empire as a political issue 
in these three decades, but because the trauma of khaki campaign critically damaged the Liberals' traditional 
faith in elections as exercises in public intellect. By re-presenting the 'sane imperialism' of 1900 in patriotic 
packaging, the Liberals were able to match the Conservatives as promoters of simple and populist electoral 
languages, and thus leave behind the highbrow but incoherent 'faddism' of the 1890s. The experience of 1900 
was thus a milestone not only in the move towards a more electorally dynamic new Liberalism, but also 
because it helped to firmly close the door on the mid-Victorian ideal of high-minded electoral politics with the 
considered 'rational' voter at its centre. Imperialism's importance as a consistently central election issue may 
have been exaggerated, but its moment in the sun nonetheless contributed to a more fundamental 
transformation in party culture which ironically affected the Liberal party more than the Conservatives. 
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87 Readman, ‘Liberal Party',_272. 
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Norfolk), Stevenson (Eye), and Buxton (Ipswich) respectively. 
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117 Stowmarket Post, 11_Jan_1906; Norwich Argus, 6_Jan_1906. 
118 Russell, Liberal Landslide,_ 87-90. 
119 Green, 'Radical Conservatism',_667-92,_686-8; Jay, Joseph Chamberlain,_301-2; Judd, Radical Joe,_241-42; Garvin and Amery, Joseph 
Chamberlain, vol. XI,_795; Marsh, Entrepreneur,_626. 
120 P. Readman and L. Blaxill, 'Edwardian By-Elections' in Readman and Otte, By-Elections, 239-40. 
121 Readman, 'Liberal Party', 300-1; Land and Nation,_34-5. 
122H. Campbell-Bannerman, The Khaki Government: How it Fares in June, 1904: Report of a Speech Delivered by the Right Hon. Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman, G.C.B., M.P. on Thursday, June 2, 1904 (London,_1904),_9. 
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128 Trentmann, Free Trade Nation,_81-133. 
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131 Bentley, Climax,_109. 
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example by Churchill. See Morning Post, 20_May_1907. See also R. Jebb, The  Imperial Conference, vol.2 (London,_1911), _ch.XIII. Indeed, a 
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136 See Trentmann, Free Trade Nation , which does not contain a single reference to the election of 1900. 
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